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Since Bennett and Brassard [1] suggested their quantum key distribution pro-
tocol(BB84 protocol) in 1984, the subject has been extensively studied both the-
oretically and experimentally. The protocol allows two remote parties Alice and
Bob to create and share a secret key using a quantum channel and public authenti-
cated communications. The quantum key created in this way is in principle secure
because eavesdroppers have no way to tap the quantum channel without disturb
it. In the protocol, two level quantum bits are measured in two basis, X and Z
randomly by Bob. So at least half of the measurement results will be discarded
because Bob has a half probability taking the measurement in a wrong basis. On
the other hand, the security is not the maximum in BB84 protocol. To increase
the security, one may straightforwardly increase the number of basis used in the
protocol. For example, six state protocol was proposed recently [2] for two level
system. However, in this way, it seems to be the case that the higher the security
is, the more measurement results will be finally discarded. So it should be inter-
esting to find a protocol by which both the economy and security are maximized.
It looks impossible at a first sight to the strategy. Here we give a new protocol to
maximize both economy and security simultaneously. In the new protocol Bob can
always measures the qubits in correct basis so that no measurement results will be
discarded( except the ones used to check eavesdropping) in principle. Besides this,
we give the condition to maximize the security of the protocol under the symmetric
channel.
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In the BB84 protocol and all other QKD protocols raised previously, Bob takes measurement
to each individual qubit in a basis randomly chosen from certain set before Alice announces the
correct bases. So it is impossible for Bob to always takes the correct basis. In our new protocol,
after Bob receives the qubits from Alice, he informs Alice so through public channel and stores
the qubits at the moment. Informed by Bob that he has received the qubits, Alice announces
the correct bases for all qubits. Bob then measures each qubits in the bases announced by
Alice. Our protocol works in the following way:(The Rome words are remarks to the protocol)
Protocol 1: General Efficient Protocol
1. Alice prepares n independent qubits by the state jQAi = jΨ1i ⊗ jΨ2i    jΨni. Here
jΨki is the state of kth qubit, k from 1 to n. The state of each individual qubits is ran-
domly chosen from the set of 2m states V = fjψ1i, jψ2i    jψmi, jψ′1i, jψ′2i    jψ′mig. Here
(jψii, jψ′ii) = R0(θi, φi)(j0i, j1i), (j0i, j1i) is the basis of Z and i from 1 to m. R0 is a ro-
tating operator, θi, φi are two independent rotating angles in x − z plane and x − y plane,
respectively . So, each state jΨki here is determined by two criterions, one is the subset it
is chosen from, i.e. fjψiig or fjψ′iig, the other is R0 operator. For simplicity, we denote the
rotating operator corresponding to the kth qubit as R0(k). For example, if jΨki = R0(θx, φx),
then we say R0(k) = R0(θx, φx). She records each individual state jΨki by the classical bit 0 if
it is from the subset fjψiig, or classical bit 1 if it is from subset fjψ′iig, so that she has a string
of classical bits, Sc.
2. Alices sends the qubits to Bob. She sends them in a way that, to each qubit, Bob knows its
subscript k(but not its state vector jΨki). For example, she can send them one by one.
3. Bob stores the qubits, and informs Alice through classical public channel that he has received
them. This step is the heart of our work.
4. Alice announces the information of fR0(k)g, k from 1 to n. This can also be regarded the
announcement of the correct measurement bases for each individual qubits.
5. Bob measures each qubit in the basis announced by Alice accordingly. He records the mea-
surement results of each qubits in order. Whenever a bit is from subset fjψ′iig (or fjψiig), he
records it as 0( or 1).
6. Bob randomly chooses a subset(G) of the measurement results and compare them with the
corresponding records in SA kept by Alice. The comparison is done through public channel.
7. If all the results are the same, they believe there is no eavesdropping. Or for the known noisy
channel, if the correlation is higher than certain threshold, they accept it.
8. With the subset G discarded, the original record Sc of Alice is now the shared key.
9. For the noisy channel, error correction can be done [3] for the privacy amplification.
Since BB84 protocol and the 6 state protocol have been proven secure already [5{9], to demon-
strate the security of our ecient protocol, we rst choose two specic cases of our protocol
and compare them with the BB84 and 6 states protocol, respectively. We have
Efficient BB84 protocol(EBB84 protocol): If we x the value of all φi = 0 and restrict
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the values of θi being randomly chosen from the set f0, pi/2g, we get our ecient BB84 protocol.
Efficient 6 state protocol: Similarly, If we restrict the values of θi and fφig being ran-
domly chosen from the sets f0, pi/2g and f0, pi/2g, we get our ecient 6 state protocol.
Proposition 1: The ecient BB84 protocol and the ecient 6 state protocol are secure.
In the following security proof, we just take the ecient BB84 protocol as an example. The
proof for the ecient 6 state protocol can be done in a similar way. Consider both BB84 and
EBB84 protocols. Most generally, there are two criterions to measure the security of a protocol.
One is the information(IAE) about SA eavesdropper can obtain after an attack, the other is
the disturbance(D) caused by the attack to each qubits. Suppose one uses certain function
F (IAE , D) to quantify the security under certain attack. F should be a decreasing function of
IAE and increasing function of D.( We need not give any specic formula for the F function
here.) In general, the eavesdropper may intercept the qubits from Alice, take certain operation
O^ to ρA = jQAihQAj and her ancilla ρE . After the operation O^, ρA is changed into ρ′A and ρE is
changed into ρ′E . She then sends ρ
′
A to Bob. Eavesdropper
′s disturbance to the qubits QA can
be quantied as the distance between state jQAi and state ρ′A. After ρ′A is sent out, the distur-
bance to jQAi is determined. Because no matter what local operation is done by eavesdropper
latter on, it cannot change the state ρ′A which is now in Bob
′s subspace. After Alice announces
the correct bases at time tA, the maximal obtainable information [4] about SA to eavesdropper
is determined. Note any operation done by Bob before or after tA is irrelevant, because it
does not change the state ρ′E . Since what Bob has done does not matter to eavesdropper, the
information on what Bob has done is denitely useless to eavesdropper. For example, the
announcement of Bob′s measurement basis in BB84 protocol is useless to eavesdropper. The
eavesdropper may latter, take optimized measurement M at time tM to maximally obtain the
information of SA. Note since no operation of eavesdropper can change the value D, to minimize
F value, eavesdropper just chooses certain measurement M which maximizes her information
on SA. In general, M is dependent on bases announced by Alice. The specic time at which
M is carried out does not matter. We assume M is taken immediately after Alice announces
the bases information.
So far we we have shown that both the disturbance D and the information IAE are irrelevant
to anything done by Bob. They are also irrelevant to operations done by Alice after tA. So, we
can disregard everything done by Bob in the whole protocol and disregard everything done by
Alice after time tA in calculating the F value for both BB84 and EBB84 protocols. After dis-
regarding all these irrelevant issues, the BB84 protocol and our EBB84 protocol are identical.
Therefore, given the same attack, the value of security function F (IAE, D) must be the same
for BB84 protocol and EBB84 protocol. Suppose we have a standard that a protocol is secure
if F value larger than certain threshold F0. Assume there is an attack under which F > F0 for
BB84 protocol. Then we can use the same attack to EBB84 and we must also have F > F0.
This is to say, if BB84 protocol is secure, then EBB84 protocol is also secure. It has been shown
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already that BB84 protocol is secure [5{8]. So we get proposition 1 above.
In the BB84 protocol, half of the measurement results are discarded because of the wrong mea-
surement taken by Bob. In our modied protocol, we have doubled the eciency. Obviously,
our revised 6 state protocol have tripled the eciency while maintaining the same security
compared with original one.
More generally, we can consider a protocol P and an ecient protocol EP. In protocol P
Bob takes the individual measurement to each qubit in bases randomly chosen from certain set
before Alice announces the correct bases used to each individual qubits. All other steps are
just same with BB84.
In protocol EP, informed by Bob that he has received and stored the qubits transmitted by
Alice, Alice announces the correct bases for each individual qubits rst. Bob then measures
each individual qubits in the bases announced by Alice accordingly. All other steps are just
same with EBB84. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If protocol P is secure then protocol EP is secure.
The proof can be done analogously to that of proposition 1.
In the Protocol 1, whatever set of bases V is chosen, Bob will always be able to measure
the qubits in correct bases. Because he does so after Alice announces the correct bases for
each individual qubits. Now we show how to nd the optimized set V in protocol 1 for the
symmetric channel. Here the symmetric channel is dened as the following:
Suppose there are protocol EP1 and protocol EP2. In protocol EP1, Alice chooses the states
from a set V1, V1 has 2m elements. In protocol EP2 Alice chooses each states from the set V2,
V2 has also 2m elements. Everything else in protocol EP1 and EP2 is identical. We say that the
channel is symmetric if under such channel, protocol EP1 is always equivalent to EP2, provided
that we can nd a unitary transformation U satisfying UV2 = V1.
Suppose in protocol 1, the security is maximized when V = V0. Here V0 consists of 2m
elements(states). We denote this protocol as EP0. Suppose in protocol EP0, the F value is
F (EP0) under eavesdropper
′s optimal attack O^ = O(V0).
Now we consider protocol W, which is a special case of protocol 1 in that V consists of
all states in Bloch sphere. For any single qubit jΨki prepared by Alice in the beginning of
the protocol, we can always nd m unitary operators fRkig, i from 1 to m, so that to each i,
RkijΨki is the ith element or the i + mth in V0. In protocol W, to any transmitted qubit, if
eavesdropper knows the information Rki, and to eavesdropper, i here has a uniform probability
1/m to be any number from 1 to m, she must be able to optimally attack the qubit with the
F value equal to that in protocol EP0.
To show the maximum security of protocol W , we only need to show that the security of
W is better than that of EP0. For this purpose, we rst consider a type of partially disabled
W protocol. Suppose in sending a state randomly chosen from the whole Bloch sphere, Alice
always tells eavesdropper the unitary operator Rki, i is randomly chosen from 1 to m. Note
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that Alice tells Rki to eavesdropper, but does not tell i to her. So eavesdropper only knows how
to change the state jΨki to one element in V0, but she does not know which element in V0 that
the state jΨki can be changed into, by operator Rki. Since to any jΨki, Alice choose i randomly
from 1 to m to construct the Rki, RkijΨki > has the same probability to be any element in
V0. To eavesdropper, this partially disabled W protocol is a mixture of many equivalent EP0
protocols. And to each of the protocols, the F value under optimal attack is equal to that in
EP0.
With the information Rki from Alice eavesdropper can optimally attack all qubits used
in this partially disabled W protocol. In this way, average F value here should be equal to
that in pure EP0 protocol. This is to say, in the protocol W, even Alice tells eavesdropper the
information of Rik for each transmitted qubit, it is still as secure as the protocol EP0. Of course
in the real game of protocol W, Alice does not tell any information about Rik to eavesdropper.
So the security of protocol W is not lower than protocol EP0, which had been assumed to be
maximally secure.
Proposition 3: If the quantum channel is symmetric, protocol 1 is maximally secure if
set V is all possible states of the two level system. That is, the security is maximized if Alice
chooses each state totally randomly on the Bloch sphere.
In summary, we have given a general ecient protocol for QKD(protocol 1). In some special
cases, it leads to the ecient BB84 protocol and ecient 6 state protocol. In all these protocols,
Bob always takes his measurement in correct bases to each qubits. So in principle no qubit is
wasted. The security is also proved. In particular, we give the maximum secure protocol for
the symmetric channel. The results can obviously be extended to d−dimensional case [10].
Acknowledgement: I thank Prof Imai Hiroshi for support, Dominica Mayers(NEC, Prince-
ton) and Jian-Wei Pan(U. Vienna) for useful discussions.
5
REFERENCES
[1] Bennett C. H. and Brassad G., in Proc. of IEEE Int. Conf. on Computers, Systemand
Signal Processing, Bangalore, India(IEEE, New York, 1984), 175-179.
[2] Brub D., Phys. rev. Lett. 81, 3018(1998)
[3] Deutsh D. et al, Phys. Rev. Lett., 77, 2818(1996).
[4] We introduce the concept largest obtainable information here because, in general, the
actual quantity of information is obtained by Eave′s certain further operation, such as the
meassurement to ρ′E. Dierent futher operation may lead to dierent amount of information
to Eave. For example, Eave will get no information of the key if she chooses to discard ρ′E .
[5] Mayers D., Los Alamos e-Print archive, quant/ph-9802025
[6] Inamori H., Lutkenhaus N. and Mayers M., Los Alamos e-Print archive, quant-ph/0107017
[7] Lo H.K. and Chau H.F., Science, 283, 2050(1999)
[8] Lo H.K., Los Alamos e-Print archive, quant-ph/0102138
[9] Shor P.T. and Preskill J., Phys. rev. Lett., 85, 441(2000).
[10] Cerf N. J. etal, Los Alamos ae-print rxive, quant-ph/0107130.
6
